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| 1 | +--- | |
| 2 | +title: Data handling | |
| 3 | +sort: 2 | |
| 4 | +tags: [policy, compliance] | |
| 5 | +--- | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +# Data handling | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +How customer data moves, who can touch it, and what we never do with it. | |
| 10 | + | |
| 11 | +## Classification | |
| 12 | + | |
| 13 | +Every piece of data we handle falls into one of four buckets: | |
| 14 | + | |
| 15 | +| Class | Example | Storage | Access | | |
| 16 | +|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------| | |
| 17 | +| Public | Marketing copy, API spec | Anywhere | Everyone | | |
| 18 | +| Internal | This intranet, OKRs | SSO-gated tools | All employees | | |
| 19 | +| Confidential | Customer email, order data, payment metadata | Tenant region only | Role-gated, audited | | |
| 20 | +| Restricted | PAN, CVV (not stored), employee compensation | Vault, KMS-encrypted | Two-person rule, logged | | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +## What stays in the tenant's region | |
| 23 | + | |
| 24 | +A tenant's `Confidential` data does not leave its home region. There is no cross-region read | |
| 25 | +replica of customer PII. Telemetry that flows centrally is de-identified at source and listed | |
| 26 | +explicitly: | |
| 27 | + | |
| 28 | +- Request counts, latencies, error rates, by route + status | |
| 29 | +- Aggregate billing totals, by tenant id (not by customer id) | |
| 30 | +- Webhook delivery success rates, by endpoint host (not by URL path) | |
| 31 | + | |
| 32 | +What does **not** flow centrally: customer emails, names, addresses, order line items, payment | |
| 33 | +tokens, IP addresses. | |
| 34 | + | |
| 35 | +## Access requests | |
| 36 | + | |
| 37 | +Customer-data access for support requires: | |
| 38 | + | |
| 39 | +1. An open support ticket from the customer's verified contact. | |
| 40 | +2. A manager approval click in the access tool. Approvals expire after 24 hours. | |
| 41 | +3. The query runs against the tenant's region. The audit log captures who, when, what, why. | |
| 42 | + | |
| 43 | +<div class="text-muted">Raw HTML passes through the renderer — this paragraph demonstrates that.</div> | |
| 44 | + | |
| 45 | +## What we never do | |
| 46 | + | |
| 47 | +- Sell, lease, share, or otherwise transmit customer data to third parties for marketing. | |
| 48 | +- Train models on identifiable customer data. (Aggregate, anonymised telemetry is fair game for | |
| 49 | + internal product analytics.) | |
| 50 | +- Store full card numbers (PAN). Stripe holds the cards; we hold a tokenised handle. | |
| 51 | + | |
| 52 | +## In a breach | |
| 53 | + | |
| 54 | +The first action is the [incident response runbook](incident-response.md). The second is the | |
| 55 | +legal hold and notification — Legal owns this and will direct. | |
| 56 | + | |
| 57 | +## Audits | |
| 58 | + | |
| 59 | +We run a third-party penetration test annually (currently with Trail of Bits) and an internal | |
| 60 | +red-team exercise quarterly. Findings land in the security channel within 30 days of the | |
| 61 | +engagement closing. | |